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ARGUMENT 
May a municipality, via plat amendment, take real property away from one 
private party and give it to another? The answer is no. Neither Park City nor the 
Wilsons offer any convincing reason to the contrary. 
I. 
Its Claims of Ineffectiveness Notwithstanding, Park City Effected a Taking when it 
Amended the Plat and "Relocated" the Easement 
Park City deems itself a paper tiger, unable truly to affect property rights, and 
instead empowered only administratively to alter plats, the exercise of which ability 
purportedly does not implicate private interests: 
Significantly, while the Cityfs decision moved the platted location of a non-
exclusive ski easement, at no time did the City Council make any findings 
or purport to make any ruling concerning whether or to what extent ABS 
had private property rights in the location of the originally platted ski 
easement pursuant to the subdivision's Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions (MCC&Rsff) or otherwise, and the City did not purport to 
extinguish any private property right in any easement at the original 
location. 
Brief of Appellees Park City Municipal Corporation and Park City Council ("Park City's 
Brief) at 4 - 5 . 1 
lSee also id. at 13 ("the city's administrative action amending the plat [did not] affect 
whatever private property rights ABS may be able to establish in the location of the 
easement as it was originally platted . . . ."); at 15 ("Not surprisingly, nowhere in the 
Ordinance changing the plat does the City purport to either establish or extinguish 
whatever private property rights ABS may have in the originally platted easement"); at 18 
("whatever the City's administrative decision, ABS had a legal process available to it to 
establish and protect its rights"); at 22 - 23 ("The plat amendment process simply 
provided ABS a forum where it could object to a plat amendment based upon the 
(Continued . . . ) 
Park City thus claims that ABS proceeds upon a "profound misconception" and is 
otherwise "fundamentally mistaken" when it comes to the "relatively simple 
administrative determination to allow a plat amendment." Park City's Brief at 12. The 
City's only role is to mark changes on a map. Takings are left to the courts. Id. 
Park City succeeds only in evincing the need for firm judicial intervention in this 
municipal behavior, for nothing would have happened to the ABS property right if Park 
City had not illegally amended the plat and moved the easement (followed by the grant of 
a building permit, which never could otherwise have been issued). The right of ABS to 
invoke subsequent "legal process" against the harm inflicted is cold comfort measured 
against the fact that as a direct result of Park City's plat amendment, the Wilsons' "dream 
home," Park City's Brief at 7, now sits squarely athwart the deeded ABS easement. 
Although they of course quibble with the ABS allegation of illegality, the Wilsons 
otherwise properly recognize Park City's critical role: 
Since construction of their home on lot 23 entailed expanding the size of 
the "build pad" on the subdivision plat map and moving the ski easement 
further down on their lot, Appellees Wilson also applied to Park City for a 
subdivision plat amendment. 
Brief of Intervenor-Appellees ("Wilsons' Brief) at 7. And Park City itself of course 
knew exactly what it was doing, for the record is replete with ABS arguments to the City 
Council that the easement could not be amended without depriving ABS of property 
standards applicable in such a forum. It did not extinguish ABS's rights."). 
i 
rights, and Council rejoinders that because the easement was not "separately recorded/' 
it was subject to relocation. The decision below should be reversed. 
II. 
An Express Easement Created by Plat Reference is Still an Express Easement. 
One can pinpoint exactly where Park City went wrong in this process: 
The easement was recorded as an easement on the Evergreen plat but was 
never recorded separately. In discussion with the City Attorney, it was 
determined that State Code rules regarding modification and amendment 
apply to non-exclusive easements that have been dedicated by subdivision 
plat only. 
Rec. at 1210 (April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting Minutes) (emphasis added). 
Thus, while it may be powerless to move private easements that have been "recorded 
separately" from a plat, Park City otherwise deems itself free to act when an easement is 
shown only by plat. 
Park City errs. "[Express] easements may . . . be created as a covenant or through 
a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a recorded declaration of 
easements."3 Both Appellees4 completely mischaracterize the ABS argument on the plat 
2See Rec. at 477 (Minutes of April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting), at 544 
(March 23, 2002 City Council meeting). 
3
 David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property 
Law § 12.02(b)(1) (Lexis 1999) (citing Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and 
Conveyancing, 38 Cal. L. Rev. 426, 437-38 (1950) (emphasis added). Cf Hofmeister v. 
Sparks, 660 N.W.2d 637, 638 (S.D. 2003) (plaintiffs "own land in a subdivision . . . . 
Their property rights include a platted 66* access easement across two other parcels of 
land."). 
4
 Park City's Brief"at 2 1 - 2 2 ; Wilsons1Brief at 22 -23. 
i 
issue, for ABS is not arguing that the easement had no business being on the plat in the 
first place. ABS is arguing that municipalities have no right to extinguish private 
property rights shown on a plat. Private rights created via plat remain private rights, 
immune (except in cases of takings for public use, which indisputably did not occur here) 
from municipal alteration: 
The mere fact that restrictions are inscribed upon the plat does not make 
them subject to commission approval. They are a matter of private 
concern, and are not for the public's use and benefit, as are streets and 
utility easements. They are frequently inscribed upon plats, but this is a 
matter of convenience only. They are contractual. Mutuality of covenant 
and consideration exists between the several owners of land made subject 
to a scheme of improvements. Their character is not altered by the manner 
of their documentation. 
Pubs v. Bailey, 302 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ind. 1973). (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002), the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision enjoining a planning commission from vacating 
restrictive covenants that appeared on a plat: 
The property interest at issue here is the restrictive covenant that was 
included in the plat of Broadmoor limiting construction in the plats to 
single-family residences Daniels, as owners of the right to enforce the 
covenant pursuant to their ownership of a lot in Broadmoor, may no longer 
prevent commercial development in the Lots, which were in the original 
plat of Broadmoor. Because they have been dispossessed of this 
enforcement ability by the Plan Commission, they have demonstrated a 
property right that has been taken by state action. 
Id. at 459. See also MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 579 
(Wash. App. 2002) (easements, however created, are property rights, and as such are not 
subject to relocation absent the consent of both parties."). 
Moreover, "[t]he warranty deed to ABS conveyed title and a ski easement over Lot 
23 as shown on the Amended Plat of Evergreen," Ruling and Order at 5,5 which deed is a 
separate recordation. Similarly, the initial deed from the Evergreen developer transferred 
title to Lot 23 to the Wilsons' predecessor subject to "[a]ny and all easements and rights 
of way over, along, and across said property as shown on the recorded plat." Rec. at 
1368. 
Both the trial court and Park City recognized that the City had no interest in the 
easement. See Ruling and Order at 5 ("The ski easements were not dedicated to Park 
City but were created for the benefit of the owners of each lot in the subdivision"), Rec. at 
452 (City minutes; "While the ski easements are shown on a recorded plat, the City is not 
a party to the ski easement"), at 457 (minutes; "[t]he City does not hold the easement."). 
In claiming the municipal power to rearrange easements on a plat, Park City confuses 
public easements with plat easements showing a private property right. See Pulos v. 
Bailey, supra, 302 N.E.2d at 775 (private restrictions recorded on a plat "are a matter of 
private concern, and are not for the public's use and benefit, as are streets and utility 
easements."). 
There is further no way to limit Park City's newly-minted municipal power solely 
to the relocation of easements. For example, plats must contain, inter alia, "the 
5
 See also Davis v. Epting, 454 S.E.2d 325, 327 (S.C. App. 1994) ("Where land is 
subdivided, platted into lots, and sold by reference to the plats, the buyers acquire a 
special property right in the roads shown on the plat . . . if the deed references the plat, 
the grantee acquires a private easement for the use of all streets on the map."). 
< 
boundaries, course, and dimensions of the parcels of ground," Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
804(1), and Mthe acreage or square footage for all parcels, units, or lots, and the length 
and width of the blocks and lots intended for sale " Utah Code Ann. 10-9-804(l)(c). 
Under Appellees1 reading of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-808 (which permits plat 
amendments), a municipality could change lot lines if the owner's deed simply referred to 
the property description as set forth on the plat — which is the common method of 
describing subdivision lots on all recorded deeds, and indeed was the process used for the 
Evergreen lots. See, e.g., Rec. at 1367. A municipality could decide that a landowner 
really does not need that second driveway and erase it from the fee. 
If the plat statute really means what Park City and the Wilsons say it means, then 
the law is unconstitutional.6 Statutes must be read, when possible, to avoid such 
infirmity. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) ("To the extent they endorsed 
a broad reading of the ordinance, the lower courts ran afoul of the well-established 
principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties"). Given a 
choice between Appellees1 interpretation of the statute and one which permits a 
6
 See Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, supra, 306 F.3d 445, 462 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming injunction against planning commission's use of plat statute to lift restrictive 
covenant solely for benefit of a private citizen; such use would be an illegal taking of 
private property for private purposes); Pulos v. Bailey, supra, 302 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ind. 
1973) (striking down, under United States and Indiana Constitutions, statute which 
permitted planning commission to vacate covenants recorded on plats). 
£ 
municipality to affect only easements dedicated to the public, the latter construction must 
win out.7 The decision below should be reversed. 
III. 
This Appeal is Ripe 
ABS filed two separate actions in response to the events below. The action at bar 
results from a statutory procedure permitting petitions for review of an administrative 
decision. The other action is a "private" lawsuit, names a number of defendants, 
including the Wilsons, as well as Park City, and seeks damages and injunctive relief 
arising, inter alia, from conflicts of interest on the Architectural Committee -- of which 
Brad Wilson was a member — and from the presentation of false evidence to Park City. 
Park City deems this appeal premature, given that the ABS private action remains 
undecided. The trial court declined ABSfs efforts to move the other case forward and 
ruled that the administrative appeal would have to be decided first: 
This case was initiated by a petition for review filed by ABS on June 24, 
2002 . . . . On the same date ABS filed a separate action, docket no. 
020500298, seeking a declaratory judgment against Wilson and these 
defendants and others. That case has proceeded and the court has denied a 
TRO and a motion for summary judgment, stating that this case needed to 
7
 And even in cases where a city abandons an easement dedicated to public use, a private 
right of access continues. Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) 
(adjoining landowners retained right of passage after Salt Lake City abandoned an alley 
easement; servient estate properly ordered to tear down obstructing wall.) 
8
 See Rec. at 453 (minutes; "The Evergreen Architectural Review Committee (ARC), of 
which Mr. Wilson is a member, has supplied several items of correspondence addressing 
the issue of equity."). 
7 
be decided before the merits of that case could be addressed. The parties 
agreed on April 3, 2003, to lift the stay previously agreed to in this case. 
Ruling and Order at 1. Once this case went to judgment, ABS had no choice but to 
appeal. 
Contrary to Park City's description of that tribunal's ruling, the trial court 
attributed a takings analysis to the municipality. Ruling and Order at 8. If the decision 
below in this suit is reversed, as we respectfully request that it should be, many issues in 
the private suit will be resolved as well. If the decision is affirmed, the private suit will 
retain vitality. In either case, this appeal is ripe. 
IV. 
ABS has Met its Marshalling Obligation. 
The Wilsons deem ABS in default of its duty to marshal the facts, and urge 
affirmance on that basis alone. Wilsons' Brief 'at 11 - 12. 
There is no duty to marshal evidence when the action complained of simply is 
illegal. Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 
1995).9 And no one in fact disputes Park City's skeletal findings in the case at bar: the 
Wilsons have an address, their lot is crossed by an easement, the Architectural 
Committee and developer had preliminarily approved the house plans (although the 
Architectural Committee, clearly worried by what was afoot, warned its own member that 
9
 For example, no matter how many good reasons would appear for such an action, it 
presumably is undisputed that Park City could not redraw a private lot line to give a 
portion of one lot to another. 
» 
,f[a] party encroaching on an easement does so at his own risk" and advised Wilson to get 
ABS consent; Rec. at 0421);10 no:i:e had been given that Lot 23 might try to enlarge its 
building pad; the CC&Rfs address ski easements, and Lot 22 was permitted to expand its 
own build pad, although "not having a ski easement on the lot." Rec. at 0704 - 0705 
(ordinance).11 
While they concede that this is all that Park City found, Wilsons' Brief 'at 12 -13, 
the Wilsons urge, id. at 13, that these facts suffice to "push forward into the mind the 
probability of good cause" supporting Park City's ultimate conclusion of law: that no 
material injury would result if the ABS easement was moved 90 feet down the hill.12 
Even if it were otherwise legal for Park City to relocate a private easement, one 
cannot derive the ultimate conclusion of "no material harm" from the de minimis findings 
Thus, ABS's predecessor agreed with the owner of Lot 21 that an easement could be 
narrowed and bridged to facilitate construction of a larger home. Similarly, the 
Architectural Committee warned the Wilsons that they encroached on the ABS easement 
at their own risk, and should secure ABS consent. 
11
 As we discuss below, this final finding is one of the many places where Park City's and 
the Wilsons1 arguments from equity fall apart: unlike the Wilsons1 lot, the ABS lot, 
burdened by no easement, affected no easement when its pad was expanded. 
Contrary to the Wilsons1 representation, Wilsons' Brief at 7, "m," ABS never made the 
distressing argument that it wanted "free use of all of lot 23 to get to the ski run . . . ." 
(emphasis added). To support this purported "fact," the Wilsons cite statements not by 
ABS, but by Brooks Robinson of the Park City planning staff. Robinson said what no one 
disputes: prior to construction of the Wilson house, skiers cut across the Wilson lot. Rec. 
atl071D,lns. 16-17 . 
Similarly - again contrary to the Wilsons1 representations, Wilsons' Brief at 7, "1," 
— ABS confirmed and reconfirmed that while it liked its view, its objections were not 
based primarily on "view issues." Rec. at 0439 (March 13, 2002 Work Session Notes). 
0 
recited, particularly when an ABS member partner "would have to climb up the mountain 
over 100 extra feet [through snow] to access her ski door[,]"13 when Park City rejected 
the "strong[] suggestion"14 made by ABS - in order to counter rampant Planning 
Commission speculation about the site15 -- that the Council postpone argument until after 
it could visit the site, and when ABS stated that it would not have purchased the home 
had it known that the easement could be moved.16 
V. 
The Taking was the Injury. 
Park City moved the ABS easement 90 feet downhill from the front door of the 
ABS residence.17 It is now impossible - as the trial court noted — to use that easement to 
ski to the residence. The court nonetheless decided that no harm was caused by this 
Rec. at 477 (April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting). 
14
 Rec. at 543 (May 23, 2002 City Council Meeting). See also Rec. at 1071G, Ins. 12 - 20 
(transcript). 
15
 Although he showed the Council on a map that the ABS door was close to the terminus 
of the easement, Rec. at 107IE, Ins. 5 - 7 , Brooks Robinson of the Planning Commission 
further hypothesized that because skiers using the ABS easement would have to make a 
sharp turn to get up a hill before the front door, it would make no difference whether they 
made a sharp turn 90 feet down the hill or 12 feet from the door. Rec. at 107IF, Ins. 9 -
14. 
l6Rec. at 439. 
17
 Park City alleges that the easement was moved 60 feet north. Park City's Brief dX 4 n.2, 
Park City elsewhere states that the easement was moved "some 60 feet downhill." Id. at 
7. 
in 
relocation, because before the Wilson home was built, the ABS easement was not used 
anyway: 
It is clear from the evidence that now there is no ski-in access across Lot 23 
to Lot 22. However, the Council had evidence that in fact the platted 
previous easement was not used for ski-in access, but that the users of the 
easement "cut the comer" and went in a place that was not platted because 
of the grade and trees and shrubs. Thus, the Council could have and did 
find evidence that there was no injury in moving the easement as the platted 
easement was not in fact used to ski-in in any event. 
Ruling and Order at 8 - 9. (emphasis added). 
It is perhaps not to be unexpected that skiers will take the path of least resistance, 
and thus cut diagonally across an open slope rather than take right-angle turns. Such 
actions do not work a forfeiture of the original easement once the open slope is blocked 
by the fee owner: 
[A] right-of-way by express grant is not extinguished by mere nonuse, and 
the fact that the easement holder finds a more convenient alternative route 
does not deprive the easement holder of the easement that remains for the 
holder's use and enjoyment whenever the holder has occasion to use the 
right. 
Jackvony v. Poncelet, 584 A.2d 1112, 1117 (R.I. 1991) (emphasis added).19 
18
 See also id, at 8 ("If there is a taking, there must be an injury. Because the Council 
found no injury, it necessarily found there was no taking of a substantial right."). 
19
 See also Mueller v. Bohannon, 589 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Neb. 1999) ("as to easements 
created by express grant or deed, evidence of non-use could not by itself prove 
abandonment no matter how long the nonuse"); Owens Hardware Co, v. Walters, 80 
S.E.2d 285, 288 (Ga. 1954) ("The mere fact that one does not immediately begin to 
exercise his right of use under an easement, or that he delays doing so for a number of 
years, would not occasion a loss of the easement...."). 
Moreover, the trial court's constitutional analysis ("Because the Council found no 
injury, it necessarily found there was no taking of a substantial right") is deeply flawed: 
While its bare findings regardless do not support the conclusion of "no material injury," 
even if Park City could show that access 90 feet downhill was somehow just as good as 
access near the front door - indeed, even if Park City could show that access 90 feet 
downhill was better than access near the front door — it would make no difference under 
the Takings Clause, for the taking itself is the injury. See Daniels v. Area Plan 
Commission, supra, 306 F.3d 445, 457 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court's decision to 
enjoin planning commission from lifting restrictive covenant recorded on plat, even 
though it was disputed that value of property owner's land was unaffected, and perhaps 
even enhanced, by commission's action). 
VL 
The ABS Expansion did not Relocate an Easement 
Both Park City and the Wilsons rely on the what is good for the goose theory of 
real property law: ABS received permission to expand its lot and notice that Lot 23 might 
seek to do the same. Hence, the Wilsons were entitled to move the ABS easement. 
But one does not give up a property right simply by being notified that in the 
future another may seek illegally to take it. Moreover, the notice given to ABS's 
predecessor said nothing about moving the easement. 
Park City's Brief'at 8 - 9, Wilson's Brief at 16. 
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Appellees1 jurisprudence of whatfs fair is fair (or of what goes around comes 
around) ignores another critical fact that is plainly recited in Park City's ordinance: there 
was no easement across the ABS lot. Rec. at 705. Unlike the Wilsons1 effort, the ABS 
expansion affected no other party's property rights. 2I Equity finds no purchase in the 
case at bar. 
VII. 
Rather Than Permitting Easements to be Relocated, the CCR's Simply Codify 
Utah's Common Law that the Dominant Estate Cannot Prevent the Fee from Using 
the Easement for Non-Interfering Purposes 
Under Article VI, § 8(c) of the CC&R's, 
Declarant expressly reserves for the benefit of the Owner of each Lot in the 
Subdivision an easement to ski across any portion of any other Lot which 
portion is designated as "Ski Easement" on the Plat Map for the purpose of 
gaining access between said Owner's Lot and ski runs at the Deer Valley 
Resort. The existence of this easement shall not limit or restrict the right of 
the Owner of any Lot in the Subdivision to construct buildings or structures 
upon said Lot at the locations and in the manner permitted by this 
Declaration. 
Appellees argue that what the left hand gives in the way of easement location, the right 
hand takes away by permitting easement relocation. [f the drafters had really intended 
to create a moveable easement, they easily could have said so.23 They did not. 
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 Moreover, the Wilsons received a much larger extension than the one obtained by 
ABS, thus rendering these already irrelevant comparisons even more immaterial. 
11
 See also Rec. at 440 (March 13, 2002 Work Session; "Commissioner Erickson 
commented that he believed they should rely heavily on the evidence from the CC&Rfs 
that does not restrict building of the house if the ski easement is in one location or the 
(Continued . . . ) 
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Under the CC&R's, "[t]he existence of this easement shall not limit or restrict" the 
right to build according to the CC&R's. "This" is an adjective of emphasis and 
definition, here referring to what immediately came before: the easement located at the 
place shown on the plat. According to Appellees, however, the last sentence of Section 8 
revises the easement definition to simply mean an "easement," shorn of any geographical 
location. 
The Wilsons further claim that by stating the purpose of the easement - ski access 
— the CC&R's show that the easement is mobile, because such access can be provided 
anywhere. Wilsons1 Brief at 29. In stating the purpose (something every express 
easement does) of the easement, the CC&Rfs are making it clear that the easements are 
only for that purpose (ski access), not for the construction of barbeque pits, tree houses, 
the laying of utilities, or summertime bonfires. 
And rather than reading it first as identifying an easement location and then 
stripping it away, the plausible interpretation24 of Article 8(c) is that the provision is an 
example of careful real estate lawyers at work who wished to state the rule that has 
other."). 
23For example, Article IV, § 14 of the CC&R's, "Slope Easements," permits the lot owner 
to build "Improvements located within the Slope Easement." Similar language does not 
appear in the provisions governing ski easements, yet the City Council read it in anyway. 
See Rec. at 1091 ("[f|he CC&Rfs allow construction within the ski easement.") (Minutes 
of May 23, 2002 City Council Meeting). 
24
 "[P]rovisions within a contract [must] be construed in harmony with each other." Lee 
v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1999). 
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accreted to Utah's common law over a century of practice: an easement is not a grant in 
fee. The easement holder gets the easement only for the purpose described (ski access), 
no other, and cannot use the easement as a means to deprive the fee owner of any use of 
the land that does not interfere with the easement's use. 
Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590 (Utah 1963), Wilsons' Brief at 24, perfectly 
illustrates this point. 
In Weggeland, the servient estate built a house whose wall came close to the 
driveway easement line, with "the eaves overhanging the right of way a few inches." Id. 
at 590. There was a door in the abutting wall, steps leading up to it, and also a gas meter 
cover and assorted brooms placed nearby. The plaintiff argued that because his deed 
gave him the ? exclusive" right to the driveway, the servient estate could do nothing on 
the right of way whatsoever, including (apparently) building a house whose eaves 
overhung the easement and otherwise cluttering up the abutting land. The Utah Supreme 
Court disagreed: "The difficulty with the plaintiffs contention is that if it were sound, the 
conveyance of the right of way would be tantamount to a conveyance in fee simple." Id. 
at 591. 
To the precise same effect is Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933), 
Wilsons' Brief at 27 - 28, which - contrary to the Wilsons' suggestion - nowhere says 
that an easement can be moved, but instead only held that the easement holder of a 
driveway could not prevent the owner of the servient estate from using the driveway as 
well, even when that owner operated a business, over 250 cars used the driveway a day, 
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and the owner of the dominant estate alleged that he could not breathe from the fumes 
thereby created. Id. at 295.25 
Unlike the case at bar, Wade v. Dorius, 173 P. 564 (1918), Wilsons'Brief at 24, 
did not involve an express easement. The whole point of the case was to figure out, in 
the absence of a description in the deed, what kind of appurtenant easements had passed 
during a transfer of title.26 
Finally, if Article 8(c) had intended to permit easement relocation by the burdened 
estate, it would have specifically referred to that estate. Article 8(c) instead says that the 
easement "shall not l imit . . . the Owner of any Lot in the Subdivision" to build according 
to the Declaration (emphasis added). Thus, the easement holder may not complain that 
an adjoining lot is too close to the easement, or that a house two lots over is blocking the 
splendid easement view. But Article 8(c) nowhere grants any special privileges to the 
burdened lot itself, which takes the easement as it comes. 
ABS has never denied that the Wilsons could have built their home up to the 
easement's edge, could have arched the home over the easement, could have had steps 
25The Wilsons cite Stevens for the proposition that "an easement holder cannot interfere 
with the servient owner's use of the servient land, as long as the easement holder's right of 
passage is not impaired or requires additional expense." Wilsons9 Brief at 28. One cannot 
leap from this rather unremarkable proposition to the result urged here: that express, 
deed, and fixed easements can be moved. 
26
 "The deed, while conveying appurtenances as a matter of law, was nevertheless silent 
as to just what the appurtenances were." Id. at 565. 
27
 Contrary to the Wilsons' claim, Wilsons' Brief at 28, ABS has never said that the 
building pad could not be expanded. ABS instead asserts - Opening Brief at 19, the 
(Continued . . . ) 
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abutting the easement, could have built a home with eaves that overhang the easement, 
could have located utility covers on the easement, and could have put a picnic table over 
the easement in the summer, when skiing is impossible and the purpose of the easement 
cannot be fulfilled. But what the Wilsons cannot do is move the easement. 
VIII. 
The ABS Easement is not Wandering, but Fixed. 
Cases on "roving," "floating," and similarly peripatetic easements have no place 
here. 
In Salt Lake City v. Walker, 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), Wilsons9 Brief'at 28, one 
easement was fixed, while another simply provided that Salt Lake City had a right of 
way for ditches, power lines, and other facilities "to be constructed by the City wherever 
these may be located now or hereafter . . . . " Id. at 368. This latter easement was thus a: 
"floating" or "roaming" easement, the location of which may be fixed by 
agreement of the parties, by the use of a particular way by the grantee with 
the acquiescence of the grantor for a considerable period of time, or by one 
party in whom the grant vests the right of selection or the right to fix the 
grant, or where the rule of necessity determines the location because any 
other place would annul, ruin, or militate against the grant. 
Id. at 368. 
citation used by the Wilsons - that the building pad could not be expanded over the 
easement. 
28
" Admittedly the right of way over the lands in Section 24 is 66 feet wide, and the center 
line thereof is fixed by a starting point, directions and distances in the deed creating the 
easement." Id. at 368. 
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No such ambiguities attend the case at bar. Notwithstanding the Wilsons' claim -
made at least twice29 - that the plat shows only the "approximate" easement location, that 
location is instead specifically set forth: the Lot 23 Easement (a) is 30 feet wide, (b) 
provides ski access running from the common boundary of Lots 22 and 23, across Lot 23 
in a northwesterly direction to the Last Chance Ski Trail, and (c) begins on the 
southeasterly side of Lot 23 sixty (60) feet from Silver Lake Drive. Rec. at 1363, 1365, 
1419, and 1421. 
The plat fixes the location of the ski easement (and the Wilsons never explain why 
moving the easement 90 feet downhill is in any way consistent even with the 
"approximate location" theory - the Wilsons are really arguing that somehow the plat did 
not suggest any location). The deed incorporates the plat. There is no need to fix what is 
already set. (Indeed, even in cases of roving easements, the roving stops once the 
easement finds a home). 
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697, 2004 UT App. 256 
(2004), Wilsons' Brief at 28, provides no respite for the Wilsons' cause, for that case 
(wherein this Court reiterated that "[e]xpress easements involve real property interests," 
id. at f 9) again involved a roving easement, by definition the location of which was not 
fixed in the deed. Id. at Tf 22. There is no need to resort to such issues when the ultimate 
goal - where does the easement go? - has already been reached via express demarcations. 
29
 See Wilsons' Brief dX 21 (plat showed only a "rough approximation of where the ski 
easement crossed"), at 25 ("the recorded plat map contains only an approximation of 
where the easement crosses"). 
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IX. 
Utah Has Not Adopted the Restatement Rule — nor Should It. 
"Easements are . . . constitutionally cognizable property interests." First Unitarian 
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002). The location of 
the easement at bar is fixed. "The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that they lack the equitable authority to order relocation of an easement, even if the 
change is necessary to one estate and would not inconvenience the other." MacMeekin v. 
Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 575 (Wash. App. 2002). The Wilsons' 
ultimate solution is to ask the Court to reverse - retroactively - long-settled rules of 
property law. For a host of reasons, that relief should be denied. 
1. Utah Follows the Majority Rule Forbidding Unilateral Relocation of 
Easements. 
The Wilsons urge upon this Court the minority rule adopted by Section 4.8 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes (2000), pursuant to which an easement may 
be unilaterally relocated under certain circumstances, none of which exist here anyway.30 
See generally Note: The Right of Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements 
Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (May, 1996) ("Although the drafters of the 
Restatement recognize the minority status of the latter rule, they have nonetheless chosen 
30
 Even under the Restatement, an easement may be unilaterally moved only when the 
change is "reasonable," and does not "significantly lessen" the easement's utility, 
"increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment," or 
"frustrate the purpose" of the easement." None of those factors were met here. 
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to adopt it. This Note argues that the drafters1 selection of the minority rule is unwise/'); 
MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 571 (Wash. App. 2002) ("We 
decline to adopt the Restatement (Third) approach, and adhere to the traditional rule that 
easements may not be relocated absent mutual consent of the owners of the dominant and 
servient estates, regardless of how the easement was created."). 
Regardless of whether New York has permitted unilateral relocation of easements 
since 1865, Wilsons' Brief &\ 27, or whether the Restatement does so now, Utah follows 
the majority rule. See Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Hyland Realty, Inc., 334 P.2d 
755, 756 (Utah 1959) (owner of servient estate cannot ffchang[e] the course of the 
easement or . . . construct^ facilities on or in the easement itself without the consent of 
the owner of the dominant tenement."). 
The Wilsons heatedly claim that the majority rule "lead[s] to the absurd result of 
the ski easement 'tail1 wagging the ownership fdogf: it would elevate the ski easement over 
the/ee interest of every lot owner to have a house on a lot." Wilsons' Brief 'at 27. Such 
pique is unconvincing, for the Wilsons have described (albeit in pejorative tones) exactly 
what easements do - particularly explicit easements that show up on plats and deeds, thus 
indisputably alerting the purchaser that the lot comes encumbered with a tail of definite 
location. Easements cannot be obstructed by the fee owner. They cannot be "relocated" 
absent the consent of the dominant estate. Had the Wilsons wished to avoid encumbered 
land, they should have purchased elsewhere. 
2. Because it would Destroy Vested Rights, the Restatement Rule, Even if 
Adopted, Cannot be Retroactively Applied to the ABS Easement. 
Judicial decisions which would unsettle prior reliance should be only 
prospectively applied.31 Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348, 
1352 (Utah 1993).32 When the ABS easement was created, Utah law unequivocally 
prohibited the servient estate from relocating the easement without consent. If the 
Restatement rule is adopted and applied retroactively to the ABS easement, ABS will be 
stripped of a property right (scores of other Utah easement holders will be similarly 
surprised). 
The Restatement rule itself is freighted with yet a further argument against 
retroactivity, for it expressly permits the parties to draft out of the rule permitting 
unilateral relocation by inserting a contract provision which "expressly denie[s]M that 
right. Restatement, Section 4.8(3). See also Comment "ff ("[i]f the purchaser of an 
easement wishes to retain control over any change in location, the instrument should be 
3Similarly, a statute (which a Restatement rule resembles) applies retroactively only if it 
expressly so states. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3. 
32
 The Utah Supreme Court has disavowed the federal rule requiring universal retroactive 
application of judicial decisions: 
We look to the impact retroactive application would have on those affected. 
When we conclude that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state 
of the law or that retroactive application of the new law may otherwise 
create an undue burden, the court may order that a decision apply only 
prospectively. 
Kennecott Corp., 862 P.2d at 1352, quoting Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 
(Utah 1991). 
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drafted to accomplish that result."). No such contractual provision was required at the 
time the ABS easement was granted. ABS never would have agreed with the developer 
to a CC&R provision permitting the ABS easement to be moved 90 (or 60) feet 
downhill. The Restatement rule cannot be adopted unless the status quo ante is restored 
and the parties given permission to bargain for the rights and limitations provided under 
that rule. 
Indeed, all lot owners must be brought in, because each easement is for the benefit 
of all.34 The Restatement rule is in fact unworkable in cases of multiple holders of 
multiple easements. Utah law, not the Restatement, governs the case at bar. 
X. 
The Wilsons are not Entitled to Equity. 
The Wilsons are not innocent encroachers. Wilsons' Brief at 35.35 ABS moved for 
an injunction in the companion case stopping construction pending the outcome of 
litigation. The Wilsons responded that they wanted to start building. ABS argued that if 
constructed, the portion of house over the easement would have to be torn down if ABS 
prevailed. The TRO was denied. ABS unsuccessfully sought an interlocutory appeal. 
See Ruling and Order at 1 (recounting history of the two cases). 
33Rec. at 439. 
34
 The CC&Rfs cannot be amended without an affirmative vote of 90% of the lots then 
subject to thereto. Article VI, §5. The CC&Rfs cannot be amended under any 
circumstances to deprive a Lot owner 
35
 "Appellees Wilson acted innocently, without knowledge or warning that they might be 
encroaching on Appellant's property rights." 
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In Fairfax County Park Authority v. George Atkisson, 445 S.E.2d 101 (Va. 1994), 
the recorded deed created an express easement. A subsequent purchaser of the servient 
estate, despite the protests and demands of the easement holder, subdivided the estate, 
built houses atop the easement, sold the houses to third parties, and a portion of 
undeveloped land (over which also ran the easement) to the Fairfax County Park 
Authority. 445 S.E. 2d at 103. 
The dominant estate sued the developer, homeowners, and park authority. The 
chancellor awarded damages, and further directed the park authority to provide a 
different route for the easement. The park authority appealed. The Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed, rejected the developer's argument that "the chancellor's decree is 
appropriate because it merely requires the relocation of the existing easement," 445 
S.E.2d at 104, held that the existing easement could not be relocated without the consent 
of all affected parties, and remanded the case to see if the disputants could agree on an 
alternate site, and failing that, for an order directing the developer and the homeowners to 
"remove any obstructions that interfere with the Atkissions* use of the express easement. 
Id. at 105. 
ABS repeatedly told the Wilsons that the easement could not be moved, and 
sought all relief possible to stop construction. The Wilsons are not innocent encroachers. 
XI. 
ABS is Entitled to Fees and Costs. The Wilsons are Not. 
Although they failed to advance this argument below (save for inserting the 
standard request for fees in their response to the Petition for Review), the Wilsons now 
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claim that they are entitled to fees for fending off the ABS attempt to "enforce" the 
CC&R's. Wilsons' Brief at 37. ABS has not here sought (to use the actual phrase of 
Section 1(a) of Article VI) to "enjoin the breach" of a CC&R covenant. ABS sought a 
declaration that property law precluded movement of a deeded easement. See Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) (fees 
awardable only if permitted by statute or contract). 
There has, however, been an illegal taking of ABSfs property right by state action, 
for which Section 1983 provides a remedy. Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, supra, 
306 F.3d 445, 451, 459 (7th Cir. 2002). Contrary to Park City's claim that this issue 
arises for the first time on appeal, Park City's Brief at 21, n.7, ABS preserved below its 
right to fees under federal law. Rec. at 1444 (memorandum), at 1634, p. 13, Ins. 19 - 25 
(March 4, 2004 oral argument). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision, and that of the Park City Council, should be reversed, 
the easement restored, and ABS awarded its fees and costs against Park City. 
DATED this 11th day of JafiuarK2005 
Mark W. Dykes 
Colin W. McMullin 
TESCH LAW OFFICES 
By: jjllS^L TC^M 
I. Tescn Joseph E. 
Counsel for Appellant 
24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of January, 2005, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were mailed by first class mail, postage 
prepaid thereon, to: 
Jody K. Burnett, #0499 
Robert C. Keller, #4861 
Williams & Hunt 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Mark D. Harrington, #6562 
Park City Attorney 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
John Martinez, #4523 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Steven W. Dougherty, #0906 
Anderson & Karrenburg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
